In view of the uncertainty over the ability of merging …rms to achieve e¢ ciency gains, we model the post-merger situation as a Cournot oligopoly wherein the outsiders face uncertainty about the merged entity's …nal cost. At the Bayesian equilibrium, a bilateral merger is pro…table provided the non-merged …rms su¢ -ciently believe that the merger will generate large enough e¢ ciency gains, even if ex post none actually materialize. The e¤ects of the merger on market performance are shown to follow similar threshold rules. The …ndings are broadly consistent with stylized facts. An extensive welfare analysis is conducted, bringing out the key role of e¢ ciency gains and the di¤erent implications of consumer and social welfare standards.
Introduction
Mergers and acquisitions constitute a major feature of the economic landscape of most industrialized countries. Historically, mergers have displayed a clear tendency to occur in waves, stretching from the end of the nineteenth century to the present. To provide an idea of the numbers and resources involved, over the period [1981] [1982] [1983] [1984] [1985] [1986] [1987] [1988] [1989] [1990] [1991] [1992] [1993] [1994] [1995] [1996] [1997] [1998] , there were nearly 70,000 merger announcements worldwide, with each deal worth at least 1 million U.S. dollars, of which nearly 45,000 were actually implemented. The average deal was valued at 220 million U.S. dollars (base year 1995). Of these, 42% were horizontal mergers, de…ned as those involving two companies with sales in the same 4-digit industry, 54% were conglomerate mergers, and 4% were vertical mergers (Gugler, Mueller, Yurtoglu and Zulehner, 2003 ; henceforth GMYZ).
Mergers have been an important source of increase in market concentration, particularly outside the U.S. (Schmalensee, 1989) . Antitrust policy on mergers has undergone extensive revisions over the last decade, both in the U.S. and in Europe. Not surprisingly, the topic has received considerable scholarly attention from industrial, business and …nancial economists over the last two decades. An extensive empirical and theoretical literature has explored the motives of mergers and their consequences on business activity. While both approaches have yielded useful insights, allowing industrial economists to reach a consensus on various aspects of merger performance, major points of controversy remain. In particular, important discrepancies exist between key theoretical …ndings and stylized facts based on empirical and event studies.
By their very nature, mergers pose a complex conceptual challenge, wherein structure and conduct are inextricably intertwined. The theoretical literature on horizontal mergers relies largely on the standard Cournot model. Since the pioneering work of Salant, Switzer and Reynolds (1983) , henceforth SSR, a central postulate is that the pre-merger and the post-merger situations are represented as Cournot equilibrium points involving di¤erent market structures, with the merged entity being treated as a single player in the post-merger game. SSR showed that in the context of an n-…rm symmetric Cournot oligopoly with linear demand and costs, for a merger to be profitable, it should comprise a pre-merger market share of at least 80%. Allowing the merging …rms to exploit production synergies in some way, thereby lowering their postmerger costs, leads to a wider scope for pro…table mergers (Perry and Porter, 1985 , Farrell and Shapiro, 1990 , and McAfee and Williams, 1992 . A similar result holds under su¢ ciently concave demand (Fauli-Oller, 1996) . By contrast, postulating Bertrand competition with di¤erentiated products, Deneckere and Davidson (1985) establish that every merger would be pro…table.
tance for all aspects of the economics of mergers, the evidence is not direct as such gains are di¢ cult to estimate, but rather deductive, and the …ndings are controversial 6 .
While many studies, including Ravenscraft and Scherer (1987) , report little support for a positive relationship, GMYZ concludes that 29% of all mergers engendered e¢ ciency gains, as suggested by the observation of an increase in both pro…ts and sales. Naturally, it is very di¢ cult to disentangle the e¢ ciency gain and the market power e¤ects due to a merger. On the other hand, there appears to be a consensus reached on the basis of case studies and casual observation that while some mergers were successful in securing substantial e¢ ciency gains 7 , there is great variability on this issue.
In view of the lack of congruence between theoretical and empirical …ndings 8 , the primary challenge of theoretical work on mergers is to come up with alternative models of merger behavior that would close this gap, while at the same time preserving the equilibrium nature of both the pre and post-merger situations, a consensual feature of the theoretical literature -at least since Farrell and Shapiro (1990) . This paper constitutes an attempt in this direction within the framework of static analysis. The key novel ingredient is that the non-merging …rms face uncertainty as to the e¢ ciency gains, in terms of variable costs, that the merged …rm could achieve. More precisely, they believe that with some …xed probability, the merged …rm will end up with a lower unit cost than before and with the complementary probability, it will retain its original unit cost. The lower cost may correspond, for example, to the claim made by the merging …rms to the antitrust agency, possibly appropriately discounted by the rival …rms, or to a past average achieved by comparable mergers in related industries. Pre-merger competition is modelled as a standard Cournot oligopoly with identical …rms while short-run post-merger competition involves a Bayesian Cournot equilibrium, with the merged …rm alone being informed about its true cost. Demand and costs are assumed linear, both for simplicity and for ease of comparison with much of the literature.
This simple formulation seems natural and appropriate, in view of the stylized facts and other common observations following merger announcements. Indeed, for the merger to obtain the approval of antitrust authorities in most countries, the candidate …rms have to convincingly document scope for signi…cant e¢ ciency gains, via the 6 That mergers often result in savings on …xed costs, including such components as ine¢ cient plant shut-downs, personnel consolidation and R&D expenses, is a well-accepted proposition. Likewise, mergers also arguably require substantial one-time transaction costs to actually be implemented. Except for some brief mention below, we follow the literature in ignoring these e¤ects. 7 For instance, a case study in Scherer et. al. (1975) reports a 40% increase in output per worker upon post-merger reorganization. Other success stories may be found in Fisher and Lande (1983) . 8 Observe that with the above stylized fact on pro…tability, the conclusions reached under the Cournot and the Bertrand approaches to mergers are equally far o¤ the mark, in opposite directions. exploitation of organizational and production synergies. In most cases, the approval of a merger presumes that the antitrust authority has been swayed by the …rms'claims of lurking e¢ ciency gains. Likewise, the initial positive reaction of the …nancial markets provides some support for the presumption that the merger is likely to lead to strong e¢ ciency gains. In this respect, the magnitude of the upward shift in share prices suggests that an increase in market power alone is unlikely to yield the concomitant increase in expected pro…ts. Another point is that the …rms in the industry frequently react with apprehension to a merger announcement by two of their rivals. These typical facts lend credence to the postulate that all concerned parties generally hold beliefs about the prospect of e¢ ciency gains that are naturally captured by a Bayesian model. Indeed, the revised Section 4 of the Horizontal Merger Guidelines issued by the U.S.
Department of Justice and the Federal Trade Commission in 1997 states that "e¢ ciencies are di¢ cult to verify and quantify, in part because much of the information relating to e¢ ciencies is uniquely in the possession of the merging …rms. Moreover, e¢ ciencies projected reasonably and in good faith by the merging …rms may not be realized". 9 Further discussion in support of our Bayesian setting is given in Section 5.2.
One of our main results states that if the non-merged …rms believe with a su¢ ciently high probability that the merged …rm will experience a high enough e¢ ciency gain, the merger will be pro…table, even if one takes the worst-case scenario for the merged …rm, wherein it ends up not experiencing any e¢ ciency gain at all. Given that the answer to this central question rests on two threshold values, the belief and the e¢ ciency gain, a natural question is whether these would typically be reasonable. We illustrate that these thresholds are indeed quite plausible. Similar threshold rules are shown to govern the e¤ects of a merger on the merged …rm's and outsiders'outputs as well as on industry price, using worst case, best case and ex ante (or expected) benchmarks.
In all theoretical models with complete information and no e¢ ciency gains, whether based on Cournot or on Bertrand competition, mergers always exert a positive externality on non-merged …rms. In a Bayesian formulation, the nature of this externality also follows a threshold rule depending on the same pair of parameter values, so that it may well be negative. Similar remarks may be made about market shares and sales.
The set of possible outcomes following a merger is substantially expanded, with one or 9 Fisher and Lande (1983) assert that "e¢ ciencies still are enormously di¢ cult to predict on a case-by-case basis...". Likewise, according to FTC chairman Robert Pitofsky, the e¢ ciencies defense is "easy to assert and sometimes di¢ cult to disprove" (Quoted in J. Kattan (1994) , E¢ ciencies and merger analysis, Antitrsut Law Journal, 62, 513). One is tempted to add that if all the federal agencies empowered to ascertain the prospects of e¢ ciency gains admit to the complexity of the task, the rival …rms and outside analysts of the industry will typically …nd it beyond hope. As a consequence, these outsiders have no option after the merger other than to engage in Bayesian behavior. both the merged …rm and the outsiders, or neither of them, being possible bene…ciaries.
In analyzing the welfare e¤ects of mergers, we proceed along the three possible evaluation criteria: worst-case, ex ante (or expected) and best-case scenarios, from the merged …rm's standpoint. For both consumer surplus and social welfare, the former benchmark yields a negative e¤ect of mergers while the latter two lead to thresholds depending again on the belief and the e¢ ciency gain levels. The threshold rule associated with the ex ante and worst case benchmarks con…rms the central role played by expected e¢ ciency gains in gauging the welfare e¤ects of mergers, as in common antitrust practice in many countries. Another main conclusion of the paper is that an ex-ante pro…table merger is necessarily social-welfare, but not always consumer-welfare, improving. This result provides support for a laisser-faire policy if the decisive criterion rests on social welfare, but not if it rests on consumer welfare. This underscores the importance of the selection of a decisive criterion for antitrust approval of a merger.
The present set-up also demonstrates that the merging …rms have a strong incentive to overstate the extent of their potential e¢ ciency gains ex ante, not only to secure approval of the merger by antitrust authorities, but also to twist the terms of Bayesian Cournot competition in their favor, in a short-run perspective.
All in all, our results form a major departure from the complete information equilibrium analysis of the literature starting with SSR. Particularly noteworthy is the fact that the novel features of the present paper hold even in the worst-case ex post outcome of no e¢ ciency gains. In such a case, the only di¤erence between the post-merger markets in this paper and in SSR is the informational market power of the merged …rm.
An important consequence of this di¤erence is that, unlike most previous theoretical results, our conclusions are quite consistent with many empirical …ndings and stylized facts on the e¤ects of mergers on pro…tability, sales and market shares, both for the merged …rm and for the outsiders to the merger.
Informational market power thus emerges as a natural candidate for the fundamental asymmetry that mergers seem to trigger in favor of the merged …rm, which previous models have not attempted to capture. By its very nature, this new type of asymmetry is transitory, as are most investigated e¤ects of mergers. In this sense, the present theory constitutes a short-run analysis, but the short run is where most of the interest in mergers actually lies 10 . In addition, we can add a plausible dynamic extrapolation of our model to capture the resolution of uncertainty over the merged …rm's cost. Our results are consistent with GMYZ's …nding that over their …ve-year data window, from one year to the next, realized pro…ts increased for pro…table mergers but decreased for unpro…table mergers (see Section 5 where a dynamic extension of the model is discussed). A similar mechanism may be invoked to account for the initial substantial rise in share values that typically accompanies merger announcements, which often ends up spiraling downwards after one to three years.
This paper is organized as follows. After a model description in Section 2, the e¤ects of mergers on market performance are presented in Section 3, followed by a detailed welfare analysis in Section 4. Section 5 is devoted to some dynamic extensions. All computations, proofs and quantitative illustrations are gathered in an Appendix.
The Model
In the pre-merger situation, consider an industry composed of n + 1 identical …rms choosing quantity levels of a homogenous product in a market with inverse demand P = a bQ, with a > 0 and b > 0. Each …rm has constant unit cost c; with a > c > 0: Each …rm's pre-merger Cournot equilibrium output and pro…ts are:
We consider a bilateral (two-…rm) merger only. In the post-merger situation, we postulate that the outsiders (non-merged …rms) are uncertain over the resulting unit cost of the merged …rm. In particular, they believe that with probability p the merged …rm will end up with marginal cost c l < c, thus having experienced e¢ ciency gains equal to c c c l , while with probability (1 p) its cost will remain c: Here, c l may for instance be an average value attained by comparable mergers, or the value re ‡ected in post-merger simulations accepted by the merger authorities, or the actual value claimed by the merging …rms. The value of p re ‡ects the subjective perception rivals have formed about the merged …rm's ability to achieve the posited e¢ ciency gain, given the information available to them about the case.
Let q h m and q l m be the merged …rm's quantities conditional on low-cost type (i.e. with unit cost c l ) and high-cost type (i.e. with unit cost c) respectively, and Eq m be its expected quantity. Each outsider's quantity is denoted by q o . The Bayesian Nash equilibrium quantities are as follows 11 (recall that after the merger, the industry has n …rms, and c = c c l > 0 is the e¢ ciency gain):
and Eq m = a c + np c b (n + 1) .
All these quantities are strictly positive if one assumes 12 p < a c c
: The corresponding market prices are
The expected equilibrium pro…ts of each outsider …rm and the pro…ts of the merged …rm, conditional on its cost type, c or c l , are respectively
Note that it is always the case that E o h m l m , with equality throughout if and only if p = 0: In other words, the informational asymmetry created by the merger always works in favor of the merged …rm, which now outperforms its rivals even in the worst case situation wherein their costs are all equal. Whether this informational rent is su¢ cient to compensate for the fact that the merged …rm must now divide its pro…t between its two pre-merger partners is investigated in the following section.
E¤ects on Market Performance
This section provides a detailed account of the consequences of the merger on pro…ts and outputs for both the merged …rm and the outsider …rms, as well as on industry price. In dealing with these e¤ects, several options are possible. One is obviously to use expected pro…ts and outputs at the Bayesian Cournot equilibrium. This pro…t measure is arguably the relevant indicator that determines the movement and magnitude of the merged …rm's share price. We also study the worst-case scenario, wherein the merged …rm fails in achieving any ex-post e¢ ciency gains at all, so that its post-merger realized pro…ts are given by h m , as well as the best-case scenario with realized pro…ts l m . In the worst case scenario, the merger is pro…table if h m > 2 , the solution of which leads to one of our main results (note that as h m is clearly the lowest possible realized pro…t, the threshold values below are the most conservative ones).
Proposition 1 If the non-merged …rms believe su¢ ciently, i.e. with
that the merged …rm will experience large enough e¢ ciency gains
then the merger will be pro…table, even in the worst case scenario. These gains can occur only if the original cost is high enough, i.e., c > 2a
To provide some illustrative idea of the plausibility of the two threshold values given in Proposition 1, the following graphs depict the regions of (p; c l ) space for which a bilateral merger is pro…table when the merged …rm experiences no actual e¢ ciency gains ex-post, for a = 10; n = 5; 10; or 15, and c = 3 or 7. In each case, the merger is pro…table below the given curve and unpro…table above it. For the given parameters, it thus appears that the scope for mergers to be pro…table in our setting is quite broad 13 . This is consistent with the empirical facts on pro…tability, whether one goes by the more optimistic picture presented by GMYZ or by the more pessimistic numbers of Ravenscraft and Scherer (1987) and others.
In expected rather than worst-case terms, mergers are even more likely to be profitable for the merging …rms. It is easy to see that
m , so that the threshold for merger pro…tability, p (the exact formula is rather long and given in the appendix) is less demanding, thus providing wider scope for mergers. The following example o¤ers a direct comparison between the pro…tability cost threshold ; the probability threshold, p l ; is even lower than p , where p l is given by
We now investigate the e¤ects of the merger on outputs and outsiders'pro…ts. 13 In the way of comparative statics, it can be shown that the pro…tability of a two-…rm merger is enhanced by having a lower level of demand (a), a higher initial unit cost (c), or a higher initial number of …rms (n). This last point is of particular interest as it constitutes a departure from the complete information case analyzed by SSR.
14 As in Proposition 1 we need conditions on both c and c: resp., p p l m = 2n(a c) (n + 1)(n + 2) c (n + 1)(n + 2) c .
As for outsiders, the same threshold on the value of p governs the direction of change of their output as well as their pro…t, at the Bayesian Cournot equilibrium.
Proposition 3
The merger increases an outsider …rm's expected pro…t and output (i.
The merged …rm expands output in expected terms (i.e., Eq m 2q) if and only if p p o : These results suggest that the underlying informational asymmetry endows the merged …rm with a new form of market power, of an informational nature, relative to the outsider …rms. Whether this power is su¢ cient to overcome the usual mechanism that makes mergers more favorable to outsiders than to insiders depends on the levels of the potential e¢ ciency gains and of the associated belief.
As to the e¤ect on industry price, it is unambiguously upwards only when no e¢ -ciency gain is realized ex post.
Proposition 4 (a)In the worst case scenario, a merger raises industry price (P < P h ).
(b)A merger raises the expected price (P < EP ) if and only if p < p o :
(c)In the best case scenario, a merger raises industry price (P < P l ) if and only if
This …nding is consistent with empirical results reported in the few studies that have dealt directly with the price e¤ects of mergers. These studies typically report modest to signi…cant price increases, ranging from none (Borenstein, 1990 for the 1986 airline merger between TWA and Ozark) to around 10% (Kim and Singal, 1993) . We now provide an intuitive explanation of our results so far. Recall that in the full information model of SSR, each partner of a merged …rm wishes to reduce output in the post-merger situation as it now takes into account the business-stealing externality it in ‡icts on its merging partner (this is the only way to hope for a price increase, a necessary condition for pro…ts to increase for the merged …rm). Non-merging …rms react to this contraction by expanding output, due to the same externality. The resulting price increase is then not su¢ cient to imply higher pro…ts for the merged …rm. 16 By contrast, in the present Bayesian setting, the merged …rm exploits its informational market power that lies in the inability of the outsiders to adapt their outputs to its true, but unknown unit cost. Depending on the belief held by the outsiders, this new market power may well lead to the merged …rm producing more than before the merger, despite the fact that the aforementioned externality e¤ect is still present here. While a tendency for the outsiders' output to move in the opposite direction is still there, there is a range of values of p (between p 0 and p h m ) for which all …rms decrease their output after the merger, even in the worst case scenario. Similarly, there is a range of p (between p h and p o ) such that all …rms'pro…ts increase. This new diversity of strategic behavioral patterns is due to the interaction between the informational market power of the merged …rm with the well-known e¤ects of mergers in the standard SSR model (see also Gaudet and Salant, 1991) . As a result, real-life merger behavior emerges as being compatible with static equilibrium theory, at least in the short run.
Welfare Analysis
Producer surplus, P S; consumer surplus, CS; and total (social) welfare, T W; before the merger are easily found to be:
In evaluating the welfare e¤ects of a merger, we consider all the three possible evaluation benchmarks: worst-case scenario, best-case scenario, and expected terms.
We start our analysis with producer surplus. Ex-post producer surplus, conditional on the realized cost being high and low are P S h = h m + (n 1) Proposition 5 (a)In the worst-case scenario as well as in expected terms, a merger increases producer surplus, i.e., P S h = P S h P S > 0 and EP S = EP S P S > 0. (b)In the best-case scenario P S l = P S l P S may be positive or negative.
In the worst-case scenario as well as in expected terms, a merger is bene…cial to the industry as a whole as in the standard model of SSR. How these gains are divided between the insiders and the outsiders to the merger in our Bayesian setting depends of course on the usual pair of key parameters (p; c). Interestingly, it is only when e¢ ciency gains are realized ex-post that the industry as a whole may be adversely a¤ected by a merger. In this case, the conjunction of informational market power and e¢ ciency superiority of the merged …rm may lead to a reduction in outsiders'pro…ts exceeding the merger's pro…t expansion. This suggests one plausible explanation for the frequently observed apprehensive reaction of outsiders to a merger.
In the U.S., antitrust authorities generally take consumer welfare as the key indicator in merger cases. So a separate analysis of consumer surplus is highly desirable. Ex-post consumer surpluses, conditional on the actual realized cost, are Thus, according to this result, if antitrust authorities adopted an absolutely conservative standard requiring that consumer surplus increase in the worst case scenario, then no merger would ever be permitted. On the other hand, going by the ex-ante or best-case standards, the conclusion depends on the levels of p and c once more.
We now prove Proposition 6 (b) via an example showing the change in ECS can be positive or negative, depending on the parameters of the model. 17 Example 7 Consider the parameter values a = 10; b = 1; n = 10 and c = 3: The dark shaded surface is the 0 plane whereas the light shaded area denotes the change in consumer surplus. Clearly, the higher the belief and the lower the cost, the more likely it is for consumer surplus to increase. In view of our Bayesian setting and of the prospect for an e¢ ciency gain, the relationship between consumer and producer surpluses is more nuanced than in the standard SSR model. It makes sense here to ask whether an ex-ante pro…table merger will necessarily improve consumer welfare. Example 7 settles this question in the negative, as depicted in the graph below, comparing the expected pro…tability threshold (dotted line) with the threshold for an increase in expected consumer surplus (solid line). Here, if expected consumer surplus increases so does the merger's expected pro…t, but not the other way around. Only if the merger is expected to be su¢ ciently pro…table will it become bene…cial to consumers as well. Hence, antitrust authorities acting on the basis of consumer surplus should not adopt an a priori laisser-faire merger policy. 17 Consumer surplus in the best-case scenario follows a similar pattern. For example with parameters a = 10; b = 1; n = 10; c = 7; p = 0:5; and c l = 6:95; the change in consumer surplus is CS In addition, one may fully characterize the expected welfare change with a threshold belief (shown in Appendix 8.3, due to the length of the expression), along with an example indicating that a merger will be bene…cial to society as a whole, unless p and c are both very small. 18 Interestingly, this may be viewed as a Bayesian-Cournot analog of Williamson's (1968) classical e¢ ciency defense, arguing that a small e¢ ciency gain is su¢ cient to make a merger welfare-improving in a competitive economy.
While Propositions 6 and 8 reveal similar e¤ects of mergers on consumer and social welfare from a qualitative standpoint, an important divergence for merger policy is brought out in the next result, relating the private and social incentives for a merger.
Proposition 9
In the best-case scenario as well as in expected terms, a merger will increase social welfare whenever the merger is expected to be pro…table, i.e.,
This is consistent with Farrell and Shapiro's (1990, Proposition 5) …nding that, under some conditions on demand and costs that are satis…ed by our linear setting, if a merger with sure e¢ ciency gains (i.e. with p = 1 here) is pro…table to the merging …rms, it will also be welfare improving.
The implications of this result are signi…cant in that they suggest that if two …rms' wish to merge were fully based on an expected pro…t calculation, then, on the basis of a social welfare criterion, antitrust authorities should adopt a laissez-faire policy.
However, if e¢ ciency gains do not materialize ex post, then the merger will always be detrimental to society, irrespective of the ex-ante private incentives (Proposition 8). To the extent that it is widely believed that in some cases, mergers are, at least partly, motivated by managerial hubris or empire-building, the implications of Proposition 9
should be viewed with due care. The result also raises in a clear-cut manner the issue of risk-bearing in merger policy.
A continuing controversy in merger policy is whether the key decisive criterion for approving mergers should be consumer or social welfare. Our results neatly bring out the commonalities and the divergences in appropriate public policy responses depending on which standard is adopted. With the somewhat intermediate standard given by the sum of expected consumer surplus and outsiders'pro…ts, proposed by Farrell and Shapiro (1990) , the present model would not prescribe a laissez-faire policy.
Further Results and Observations
This section presents two extensions of interest, not considered so far. The …rst deals with how our Bayesian setting would a¤ect m-…rm mergers, and the second with how uncertainty over e¢ ciency gains might resolve over time. We then discuss a possible dynamic extension of the present analysis.
The Pro…tability of Multilateral Mergers
Extending consideration to multilateral mergers here, we provide plausible illustrations showing that (i) larger mergers do not necessarily fare better than bilateral mergers and (ii) larger mergers may not even be pro…table when bilateral mergers are.
With s merging …rms, each …rm's pro…t in the worst-case and ex-ante (expected) benchmarks are respectively In the case where p = 0:6; in expected terms, all mergers are pro…table, and bilateral mergers are preferred by the merged …rms to multilateral ones, at least up to 9 partners.
On the other hand, in the worst case scenario the only pro…table mergers are those involving 2; 10 or all 11 …rms. By contrast, recall that for this example, only mergers with 9; 10 or 11 …rms are pro…table in the complete information Cournot model of SSR.
Analogously, when p = 0:25, in the worst case scenario, no merger involving less than 9 …rms is pro…table, while in expected terms a bilateral merger is pro…table! These …ndings are obviously consistent with the observed reality that virtually all mergers involve two …rms, another noteworthy divergence from previous models.
On the "Dynamics" of Pro…tability
This subsection discusses some possible dynamic extensions of the static Bayesian approach to mergers, paying close attention again to the stylized facts. A …ner empirical …nding of GMYZ is that, over their …ve-year data window, from one year to the next, realized pro…ts increased for pro…table mergers but decreased for unpro…table mergers.
This seemingly strange …nding turns out to be quite consistent with our results if one adds a plausible dynamic extrapolation capturing the resolution of uncertainty over time in our model. Assuming that pro…table mergers tend to be those that indeed generate e¢ ciency gains, the outsiders progressively learn about these gains, realize with more and more certainty that they face a lower-cost merged rival and react accordingly. Likewise, if unpro…table mergers are identi…ed with those that failed to generate e¢ ciency gains, rivals will progressively …nd out over time that they face a high-cost merged rival, and the latter's pro…ts will move accordingly lower. In both cases, the process eventually settles at the full information Cournot equilibrium that re ‡ects the true e¢ ciency gains actually achieved by the merger. This argument conveys clearly the sense in which the present analysis is of a short-run nature.
In this scenario, it is important to note that the learning process envisioned is not related to signaling; it is rather nonstrategic and is based on information about p gathered via …rm reports, leaks in the investigative press, etc. Alternatively, it is reasonable to postulate that due to exogenous noise, for instance in demand or in macroeconomic variables, the outside …rms cannot fully learn the true e¢ ciency gains of the merged …rm in one, or even a few, periods. 19 There is quite a bit of anectodal evidence in support of this slow learning of the extent of e¢ ciency gains in mergers. For instance, in a report to the Federal Trade Commission advocating a two-stage process to review e¢ ciency claims, one ex ante and one ex post, Brodley (1996) argues that "the ex post proceeding should normally be held between three and …ve years after the ex ante determination. E¢ ciency realization generally will require a longer time period than that used in competitive analysis of mergers". 20 In the way of illustrative insight, consider the following example where the merger decision is based on expected merger pro…ts: An alternative plausible dynamic extension would be to a multi-period framework allowing for signalling by the merged …rm and learning on the part of outsider …rms. Such an extension would produce an even more diverse set of possible equilibrium outcomes, including separating and pooling (perfect Bayesian) equilibria. In the following example, the separating equilibrium yields an outcome that is fully consistent with the data on pro…t dynamics described above (though many other outcomes can emerge in other plausible examples).
Consider the industry in Example 10 operating over two periods with discount factor = 0:7: It can be veri…ed 21 Pr(low cost j q < 0:5398) = 0; Pr(low cost j q 0:5398) = 1
In this equilibrium, the low-cost merged …rm's pro…ts would be 0.1947 in the …rst period and rise to 0.2066 in the second, while a high-cost merged …rm's pro…ts would be 0.1227 in the …rst period and go down to 0:0744 in the second. Prior to the merger, the total pro…ts of the two …rms are 0.1250 per period. Thus, comparing period by period, the merger is pro…table for the low-cost merged …rm but unpro…table for the high-cost one. Furthermore, in ex-ante terms, using discounted expected pro…ts, the merger is pro…table (0.2125 and 0.2992 before and after the merger, respectively). Note that in a separating equilibrium, all the information is fully revealed after the …rst period.
This two-period example also admits a pooling equilibrium, albeit with beliefs that do not survive the "intuitive criterion". Indeed, there is a pooling equlibrium in which the merged …rm produces 0.3636 in the …rst period regardless of costs and each outsider produces 0.26364; however, to sustain such behavior in equilibrium, extreme beliefs such as Pr(high costj q 6 = 0:3636) = 1 are necessary.
While such strategic dynamic models are appealing, going beyond two periods in this context is unfortunately intractable. At the same time, dynamic models with incomplete information typically give rise to too many equilibrium outcomes, and the present model is no exception.
Conclusion
This paper argues that many of the circumstances surrounding mergers call for a theoretical model wherein the …rms outside the merger face a new type of rival, characterized by unknown unit costs, re ‡ecting their natural initial uncertainty about the ability of the merged …rm to achieve any (of the claimed) e¢ ciency gains. This pervasive uncertainty also a¤ects the approval decision of antitrust authorities, and triggers the 21 The associated computations are tedious, and are available from the authors upon request. favorable response by …nancial markets. Within the obvious con…nes of a static model, the proposed Bayesian Cournot equilibrium leads to an outcome that is broadly consistent with much of the empirical evidence on the industry e¤ects of mergers, on pro…ts, price and market shares for the merged …rm as well as for outsiders, at least in the short run. All in all, the model at hand re ‡ects a simple and natural modi…cation of the standard Cournot approach, based on an informational advantage of the merged …rm over outsiders, which confers additional market power to the merged …rm, bringing about a surprising level of congruence with stylized facts.
In terms of welfare, mergers lower consumer and social welfare for sure only in the worst-case scenario. In the other two scenarios, welfare depends on the levels of belief and the e¢ ciency gain. An ex-ante pro…table merger is necessarily bene…cial for expected social welfare but not necessarily for expected consumer welfare. Overall, these results vindicate the central role assigned to e¢ ciency gains in merger policy. 
Appendix
This Appendix gathers the computational details, some extra …gures, the quantitative illustrations that complement the results, and the proofs of the results in the text.
Finding the Bayesian Cournot Equilibrium
This part provides the computational details of Section 2. Each (outsider) …rm's expected payo¤s are:
The 1 st order condition yields the best response function: q i = a bEQ i c 2b
: As everybody knows the cost of n 1 …rms but not the cost of the n th …rm, the best response function and EQ = n (a c) + p c b(n + 1) :
The corresponding prices are presented in the text.
The conditional expected pro…ts of each outsider …rm are: 
Extra Figures and Explanations
This part contains supplementary …gures and their explanations. reduces to 2(a c) + p(c c l )(n 1)(n + 2) > 0; which is always true.
Welfare analysis details
This part provides the computational details of Section 4. We obtain: 
Illustrations
This part of the appendix provides some insight of a quantitative nature into some of the results of Section 4.
(a) The values of (p; c) and expected social welfare.
Consider the parameter values a = 10; b = 1; n = 10; and c = 3: It is clear that unless the belief p and the e¢ ciency gain are extremely low, a merger will be advantageous to society, i.e., expected total welfare will increase.
Example 11
Consider the parameter values a = 10; b = 1; n = 10 and c = 7: The observations made in the previous example concerning the impact of a merger to society are reinforced. In fact, as can be shown to hold for consumer surplus as well, the opportunities for a socially bene…cial merger are increased when the starting cost is higher. Naturally, higher starting costs provide more opportunities for e¢ ciency gains that are advantageous to consumers as well.
Proofs

